The pay divide by Doug Campbell
I
t’s a fact of the modern labor
market that women make less
money than men. Considerably
less, actually. Women who work full-
time now earn about 80 percent of
what their male counterparts make,
according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. And, according to at least
one study, the gender wage gap
increases by about 20 percentage
points between ages 20 and 40.
Though the gap has narrowed over
time, this divide looks unlikely to
close completely anytime soon.
An array of factors is at play here.
While professional men tend to hold
jobs as engineers or mathematicians,
professional women tend to be
employed as teachers and librarians
— occupations which pay less.
(Although, women increasingly are
working in fields that used to be the
exclusive province of men).
Additionally, women as a group work
fewer hours than men, even those
classified as employed full-time.
Women may also be subject to labor
market discrimination (though a lot
of economists would tell you that 
systematic discrimination is difficult
to imagine as sustainable in a compet-
itive environment), getting paid less
than a man for identical work. 
Then there is the simple but
important observation that women
can become mothers, often staying at
home for months or years raising their
children before returning to the work
force, if ever. As a result, their stock of
on-the-job experience slips behind
that of men’s and so, too, does their
pay. Mothers earn about 89 percent 
of what women without children earn
— a difference that by itself accounts
for almost half the wage differential
between men and women.
All of these factors are important
to consider. But what if every one 
of them — from occupational choices
to experience levels — were actually
rooted in a single, underlying cause? It
may be that no such explanation
exists. But if it did, it could prove 
useful to policymakers grappling with
how, or even whether, to address 
the wage gap.
Recently, a team of economists has
made some headway on this question.
They investigated the extent to which
men and women face different incen-
tives to invest in their future earning
power. Their work has its roots 
in the economic concept of human
capital, or, loosely, the skills that 
people acquire which help them in
the workplace.
Economists have long debated
how much the gender wage gap can
be explained in terms of human capi-
tal. Skeptics have noted that human
capital theory’s predictions are at
times inconsistent with real-world
data. But now, Richmond Fed econo-
mist Diego Restuccia and his
co-authors, Andrés Erosa and Luisa
Fuster of the University of Toronto,
are trying to quantify the role that
incentives to accumulate human capi-
tal play in the gender wage gap.
“There’s a set of people who really
believe that wage differences
between men and women can in large
part be explained by discrimination
in the labor market,” Restuccia says
in an interview. “For people who
believe in human capital, the burden
has been to show that this channel is
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indeed quantitatively important and
consistent with what we observe in
the real world.” That, in a nutshell, is
what Restuccia and his colleagues
have tried to accomplish.
ATheory is Born
The theory of human capital was
largely developed by economists Gary
Becker and Jacob Mincer at Columbia
University in the 1950s and 1960s.
Becker’s 1964 book Human Capital
popularized the notion that invest-
ments in education, training, and
health care were as important to the
economy as other means of produc-
tion. Those who accumulate human
capital, be they businesses or individ-
uals, can expect payoffs much as they
would from investments in tangible
assets. The theory says that there is a
proportional relationship between
the amount of effort people put into
obtaining experience and training and
the time they expect to work over
their lifetime.
Mincer and Solomon Polachek
applied human capital theory to the
gender gap in their seminal 1974
paper, “Family Investments in Human
Capital: Earnings of Women.” They
were among the first economists to
get hold of a data set with detailed
work histories among men and
women. Mincer and Polachek con-
cluded that because women expect
child-related career interruptions,
their incentives for investing in
human capital are weaker compared
with men.
It works this way: At age 22, a
woman might see her career arc as
beginning with an entry job, moving
up the corporate ladder to a managerial
position, only to leave the workplace
for several years after giving birth to
her first child. A man, by contrast,
might see the same arc, only he won’t
leave his job after becoming a father.
On balance, which of these — the
man or woman — is going to invest
more on-the-job effort and time? You
can call this discrimination, 
insofar as women are presumed to 
be the ones who stay home with 
the children. But for women who
expect to be the ones staying home, 
it is also an economically rational
decision.
More than 30 years later, Polachek,
now at the State University of New
York at Binghamton, recalls some
hostile initial reaction, with many
critics arguing that the study 
overlooked a role for labor market 
discrimination. But Polachek says 
it’s not so much market discrimi-
nation in action as “societal,” or 
home-life discrimination. “Our major
contribution was probably to 
understand that the division of labor 
in the home is a fairly important 
concept,” Polachek says. “It’s a 
phenomenon which explains the
differential patterns of married male
and married female investments in
future earnings power in the labor
market, which in turn plays a very
important role in explaining the male-
female wage difference.”
The theory of human capital has
been widely cited in promoting many
policies aimed at easing the gender
wage gap. Parental leave proposals, in
particular, have been grounded in the
notion that they may be powerful
solutions for this problem. Columbia
University economist Jane Waldfogel,
in an influential 1998 paper, noted
that the chief reason why women’s pay
trails that of men’s is that women with
children drag down all women’s 
earnings — the so-called “family gap.”
She put it this way: “Maternity leave
coverage, by raising women’s reten-
tion over the period of childbirth,
raises women’s wages by increasing
their levels of work experience and
job tenure and allowing them to 
maintain good job matches.”
Waldfogel cited data from Britain and
Japan as evidence that maternity leave
can raise women’s pay. “Thus,” she
says, “maternity leave, along with
other family policies, may be an effec-
tive remedy for the family gap in pay.”
Over the years, interest in human
capital as an explanation for the 
gender wage gap has ebbed and
surged. Skeptics pointed to the 1980s
as evidence that human capital 
theory wasn’t relevant. During that
time, female labor force participation
rose but wages for women didn’t see 
proportional gains. (Since then, the
gap has resumed its narrowing.)
Meanwhile, women have overtaken
men in numbers at our nation’s 
colleges, and still they trail in pay. 
To a casual observer of human capital
theory, this doesn’t always seem to 
add up.
ANew Approach
Restuccia’s main area of research has
been economic growth. He has used
human capital theory to study differ-
ing rates of productivity between
nations and differing earnings among
generations. Looking at the gender
wage gap through the lens of human
capital, then, was somewhat of a 
natural step.
Restuccia and his co-authors
decided that they wanted to test
Waldfogel’s idea that parental leave
policies would help close the gender
wage gap. To do this, they set up a
mathematical model in which human
capital is the main determinant of
how much people get paid. Human
capital evolves with experience 
(“general” human capital) and tenure
on the job (“specific” human capital). 
People base their decisions on
whether to work on how much they
think they’ll earn in the future. And
since this is a dynamic model, people
understand that leaving their jobs
even temporarily — as when women
take leave for childbirth and rearing
— can have an impact on the human
capital they accrue. To this framework
the economists added the feature of
mandatory parental leave policies,
meaning workers would be able to 
go back to their previous jobs after
tending to matters at home.
Going in, the economists expected
their results would bear out a relation-
ship between human capital and the
pay gap. But when they ran the 
calculations, they were surprised.
Their results suggested that specific
human capital wasn’t sufficient to
account for the wage gap and, by
extension, that generous mandatory
leave policies in this framework wouldhave no impact on closing
the wage gap.
Instead, it turned out
that women in the model
with good-paying jobs 
generally would decide not
to leave the work force 
in the first place — they
“self-selected” to remain on
the job. The economists
reasoned that this hap-
pened because highly
trained women didn’t want
to give up the specific 
experience they had built
up and because they had
more to lose in future earning
power. “Women who do have children
and then separate from their jobs 
typically are selected from the group
that doesn’t have a lot of human capi-
tal,” Restuccia says in an interview.
“So this selection effect mitigated the
portion of wage losses that was due to
specific human capital.”
This finding seriously threw into
question the assumption that speci-
fic human capital is important enough
to account for the difference in wages
between men and women. Not 
satisfied, Restuccia and his co-authors
decided to go back to the drawing
board. They needed a deeper under-
standing of the wage gap. Where the
original Mincer and Polachek work
tested only the overall force and
direction of the human capital 
channel, Restuccia and his colleagues
sought a quantitative answer to how
much human capital incentives
explain the gender wage gap.
This time, they built their model
so that human capital was not 
necessarily job-specific but simply
built up over time in the labor 
force — skills that could be used in
any number of occupations. To
Restuccia’s knowledge, this was 
one of the first attempts to apply
“quantitative theory” modeling 
techniques favored by macroecono-
mists to the question of human
capital’s role in the gender wage gap.
(Most analyses of the gender wage gap 
have relied on regression models 
that use empirical data.)
The emphasis on future (or life-
time) labor supply is the key
difference between the human capital
analysis done by Restuccia and his 
co-authors and the standard way
scholars have studied the wage gap. 
In the standard approach, wage differ-
ences can’t be explained by observable
factors. Men and women may have,
for example, nearly identical resumes
and years of experience — so why do
men make more money than women? 
Even when comparing among 
specific occupations and years of
experience, women are paid less than
men. The standard approach suggests
that this “unexplained” difference
must be attributable to labor market
discrimination. Instead, the human
capital approach takes into account
people’s incentives with regards to 
the future. 
The authors took pains to calibrate
their model to real-world conditions:
The percentages of women with 
children, when they have children,
and how many were the same in the
model as empirical data show them to
be. Children are the “shocks” in the
model, the only thing that differenti-
ates male and female expectations
about the future. The resulting prices
and wages were reflective of all 
the conditions in this model’s envi-
ronment. They also used panel data
(as opposed to the standard BLS data
which is a cross-section of people’s
wages over time), in which people
were followed over their careers and
in which the gap between
male and female pay was
shown to grow from 
20 percentage points to 40
percentage points between
the ages of 20 and 40.
In the economists’
resulting model, almost all
of the gap’s increase over
the life cycle can be
explained as a function of
differing incentives for
accumulating human capi-
tal. These incentives are so
robust that even women
who never have children
are affected — merely the
possibility of their withdrawing from
the labor force plays a role in how
much work they decide to do. 
Though not specifically tested, in
principle the results may even explain
wage differences between men and
women in the same jobs. A female
attorney may have fewer incentives
to, say, work 80 hours a week in pri-
vate practice trying to make partner,
instead choosing a more 9-to-5 job
that requires legal skills. “It’s a deci-
sion about how much effort to put
into human capital accumulation,”
Restuccia says. “Children are going to
affect the lifetime labor supply of
women. Our model can go a long way
in accounting for the differences in
wages between men and women.”
Maternity Leave Revisited
Given these findings, it’s particularly
interesting to note that one of the
possible policy prescriptions that
Restuccia thinks worth considering is
some sort of leave program. Though
his first paper skewered the notion,
the second paper allows that experi-
ence doesn’t have to be job-specific.
In this environment, leave policies
may increase women’s attachment to
the labor force, which in turn would
give them greater incentives to 
accumulate human capital.
Think of it this way: What 
ultimately matters most for the wage
gap is that over their careers women 
supply much less time to the labor
market than men. As a result, women
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make lesser investments in human
capital than men and, by extension,
get paid less. Parental leave policies
might help address this issue, but they
still don’t get to the heart of the prob-
lem of how to increase female labor
force participation. Any policy aimed
at closing the gender wage gap ought
to allow women to supply as much
time to the labor market as men.
“It’s clear that leave policies
should be studied in this framework,”
Restuccia says. “If parental leave 
policies do affect employment and
hours of work, they will have an effect
on wages.”
Given a choice, Restuccia (and
Polachek agrees) favors greater avail-
ability of child care services over
leave policies, in part because the 
latter has the potential of penalizing
the employer who has to keep a job
open. Moreover, child care services
(or more flexible jobs) directly target
the difference between men and
women, that of women not being 
able to see themselves dedicated 
to work as men do.
The wage gap endures, but it has
shrunk significantly. In 1979, the
overall difference was 38 percentage
points; today it is 20, according 
to government figures. The notion
that labor market discrimination
continues to play a significant role
has been hard to shake, even as, theo-
retically at least, it’s hard to imagine a
truly competitive world where that
would happen. For example: If there
really was a pool of qualified workers
who could be paid 20 percent less
than another pool of equally qualified
workers, then firms that hired the
less costly workers would make a
killing in the marketplace.  Eventually,
in a competitive world, wages would
have to be equalized.
At the same time, by no means
does Restuccia think his research
rules out a role for market discrimi-
nation. It could be that market
discrimination is just one of many
“shocks” that women encounter in
their work lives and that is propagated
by employment and human capital
accumulation decisions. It may be
something that women factor in
when deciding how much to work
and to invest in human capital accu-
mulation (though the economists’
model does not test this idea). But to
Restuccia, the findings mostly 
suggest that corporate discrimina-
tion is not as important as once
thought. As with Polachek, Restuccia
sees a greater role for home-based
discrimination than market-based.
Societal norms pull more women into
the home than market norms.
A more straightforward explana-
tion for why the wage gap persists
but has been shrinking is that women
are working more — from labor force
participation of 50.9 percent in 1979
to 59 percent in 2004 (though gains
have flattened in recent years). 
Meanwhile, male labor force parti-
cipation is sliding, from 77.8 percent
in 1979 to 73.3 percent today. These
parallel trends are perfectly in 
keeping with human capital theory.
The more one’s lifetime labor force 
participation, the greater the incen-
tives and the benefits (in the form 
of higher wages) to investment in
training and experience.
Labor-saving devices in the home —
ranging from vacuum cleaners to
microwave ovens — are thought to
have contributed to the surge of
women into the workplace. So, too, has
the general shift into a more 
service-oriented economy. Also, women
are having fewer children, meaning
they have different expectations about
future job separations than their moth-
ers. At the same time, women are
taking part-time jobs, the likes of
which didn’t exist in any significant
numbers in 1950. A big chunk of the
recent labor force gains of women are
attributable to part-time jobs.
It is on that front that economists
Restuccia, Erosa, and Fuster want to
proceed. The extent to which avail-
ability of flexible and part-time jobs, as
well as child care services, can close
the gender wage gap is next up on their
to-study list. “Maybe policies should
be implemented to allow women to
balance the time they have to put into
home with their kids but still be in the
labor market,” Restuccia says. “As long
as they’re able to supply labor time to
the market that is close to that of 
males, then the incentives are going 
to work out that women acquire as
much human capital as men.” 
Which means that, in the absence of
overt discrimination, women will 
earn as much as men, and this 
particular battle of the  sexes will 
be history.                                            RF
Becker, Gary S. Human Capital (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994.
Erosa, Andrés, Luisa Fuster, and Diego Restuccia. “AGeneral
Equilibrium Analysis of Parental Leave Policies.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond Working Paper no. 05-08, August 2005.
___. “AQuantitative Theory of the Gender Gap in Wages.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper no. 05-09,
September 2005.
Goldin, Claudia. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History
of American Women. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Mincer, Jacob, and Solomon Polachek. “Family Investments in
Human Capital: Earnings of Women.” Journal of Political Economy,
March/April 1974, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. s76-s108.
Polachek, Solomon. “How the Human Capital Model Explains
Why the Gender Wage Gap Narrowed.” Institute for the Study of
Labor Discussion Paper 1102, March 2004.
Waldfogel, Jane. “Understanding the ‘Family Gap’ in Pay for
Women with Children.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Winter 1998, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 137-156.
R EADINGS